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THE growth of the conviction that a course of legal study, under
the conditions of the modem university, may of itself be deemed a
form of liberal education, is strikingly manifested by a recent change
in the policy of the German empire. Heretofore no university stu-
dent could be matriculated there as a candidate for the degree of
furis Utriusque Doctor who was not a graduate of gymnasium, or
some other institution of like or higher character. It is now officially
announced that law students in Germany need no longer hold a
certificate from a classical gymnasium, but may be graduates of the
Realgynmasia or higher Realschulen.
UNDER the heading, "Contemporary Foreign Review" the Law
Magazine and Review, of England, publishes the following by James
Williams, D.C.L., LL.D., concerning the YALE LAW JOURNAL:
"This monthly magazine is well worth the attention of readers of the
Law Magazine and Review, as being the production of young graduates and
even undergraduates of Yale, with occasional help in the shape of articles by
more seasoned members of the profession. It is in every way a credit to
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the Yale Law School. One can only regret the absence of such a periodical
in the English Universities. No doubt the differences in the method of the
study of law account to some extent for such absence. The main differences
are two (i) We have in England very rarely, if at all, anyone who is engaged
in active professional or judicial work filling the place of an academic teacher.
This is by no means unusual in America. At Yale, for instance, the Hon.
Simeon E. Baldwin, a'judge of the Court of Errors of Connecticut, is Pro-
fessor of Constitutional and Private International Law, and Mr. Thacher,
one of the leaders of the New York bar, is Lecturer on Corporate Trusts.
The effect of this is no doubt to bring the students more* into touch with
actual practice and so enable them to conduct a magazine which contains
intcr alia a digest of recent cases. (2) In the English Universities, as a rule,
a certain list of subjects for examination is published. As long as the student
is prepared for the examination, it is generally competent for the tutor to deal
with subjects in any order and accommodate himself to the class of mind of
the pupil. It is an elastic system. The American system is inelastic. The
learning is fixed in strata. The books read in the first year are marked off
from those read in the second year. It may be that this system leads to more
definite knowledge than ours.
"It may be of some interest to note that at Yale the degrees of B.C.L
and D.C.L. are given with more logical precision than at Oxford. They are
reserved for proficiency in Civil Law, or analogous subjects, such as Admiralty-
or foreign law, and so are comparatively rare. The degrees given after the
ordinary law course are those of LL.B., M.L. and LL.D. Surely this is more
logical than the Oxford system, in which there is much more English than
Roman law in the B.C.L. examination, and in which a thesis on a Roman.
law subject for the D.C.L. degree has been of late years almost unknown."
IN Professor Sprague's article on "Alleged Blunders in Shake-
speare's Legal Terminology," in our April issue, the word property
was misprinted "prosperity," (fourth line from top of p. 316),
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INJUNCTIONS TO RESTRAIN LIBELOUS PUBLICATIONS.
The subject of equitable jurisdiction over libelous publications
has received very little attention from writers on equity jurisprud-
ence. In fact, most authorities devote but a scant paragraph to this
branch of equity, and are unanimous in declaring that no such
jurisdiction exists. This lack of consideration is, no doubt, due to
the fact that under the early decisions it was well established that
equity had no power to restrain publications of a libelous nature and
that the only remedy to the injured party was an action at law.
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That at the present time, however, no such hard and fast rule
can be laid down on this subject is clearly shown by the recent
decision of the Supreme Court of New York in the case of Marlin
Firearms Co. v Shields, 74 N. Y. Supp., 84.
In this case the complainant, a manufacturer of firearms, brought
a bill in equity praying for an injunction to restrain the defendant,
the owner and editor of a monthly magazine called "Recreation,"
from publishing certain false and fictitious letters, purporting to
come from sportsmen, specifying certain defects which do not in
fact exist, in the firearm manufactured by the complainant. The
court issued the injunction on the ground that a court of chancery
possessed power to restrain a publication by injunction, if it appeared
that the intended publication would work destruction of property or
inflict irreparable injury thereto.
Before deciding whether this decision is sanctioned by the weight
of authority, it is advisable to review briefly the development of the
subject in the equity courts. To quote from High on Injunctions,-
"Upon the question of preventive relief in equity against the publica-
tion of libelous statements, affecting the character or business of the
plaintiff, the authorities, both English and American, indicate a
noticeable want of uniformity, and are indeed wholly irreconcilable."
While this statement is substantially true, the apparent lack of
uniformity in the English decisions is not difficult to explain. By
a long line of decisions culminating in Prudential Assurance Co. v.
Knott, L. R., io Ch., 142, the English Court of Chancery consistently
held that they had no power to restrain the publication of libels even
though such publications were calculated to injure the credit, busi-
ness or character of the person aggrieved. It is true that Malins,
V. C., expressed a contrary opinion in a few cases (Springhead Spin-
ning Co. v. Riley, L. R., 6 Eq., 551; Dixon v. Holden, L. R., 13 Eq.,
355), but these decisions were speedily overruled and have been
pronounced too inconsistent to merit discussion.
By the Judicature Act of 1873, the Chancery Court, as a division
of the High Court of Justice, was given the power to issue injunc-
tions to prevent libelous publications. It is, therefore, from this act
of Parliament that the Chancery Court derived the power which it
exercised in the case of Thorley Cattle Co. v. Massam, 14 Ch. D.,
763, by restraining the publication of libelous advertisements, the
effect of which was to ruin the marketable value of the complainant's
goods. Upon the authority of this case and the later case of Quartz
Hill Co. v. Beall, 20 Ch. Div., 5Ol, it may be stated that in England
the Chancery Court will prevent by injunction the publication of
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any false statements which are calculated to injure the plaintiffs in
their property or business.
In America, the equity courts have not been aided by legislative
enactment, and it is therefore more difficult to reconcile the cases.
However, there are two principles which may be taken as firmly
established. The first is that false representations which merely
amount to the slander of the name or reputation of another or are
calculated to bring the name or reputation of another into contempt,
do not furnish a ground for the interposition of a court of equity,
for this court has no power to suspend or abridge "the right of every
person to freely speak, write or print on any subject." Vide,
Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige (N. Y.), 368; Assoc. v. Boogher, 3
Mo. App., 173; Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 Mass.,
69. The second is that equity will enjoin the publication arid circula-
tion of posters, hand-bills and circulars printed and circulated for the
purpose of intimidating persons and thereby injuring and destroying
the business of another. Vide, Emack v. Kane, 34 Fed. Rep., 47;
Casey v. Union, 45 Fed. Rep., 135; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass.,
92.
If a case can be placed within either of these principles, all diffi-
culty is avoided. When, however, the case presented has some of
the features of each of the above classes of cases, but cannot be
brought squarely within either, the decisions are irreconcilable.
The New York Supreme Court decided that the facts of the case
at bar brought it within the second of these principles and base
their decision upon the authority of Emack v. Kane, supra.
After a study of this case and the cases cited in the opinion, it is
difficult to understand how the Court could have come to this con-
clusion. In Einack v. Kane, as in all the other cases cited, the
material and vital features are the intimidation of third parties and
the combination or conspiracy to boycott the complainant. These
features are wanting in the case at bar.
The Court quotes from the opinion of Judge Blodgett in Emack
v. Kane, as follows: "It shocks my sense of justice to say that a
court of equity cannot restrain systematic and methodical outrages
like this by one man upon another's property rights. If a court of
equity cannot restrain an attack like this upon a man's business,
then the party is certainly remediless, because an action at law, in
most cases, would do no good, and ruin would be accomplished
before an adjudication would be reached." This statement, however,
must be read in the light of the particular facts of the case then
under consideration and is no more applicable to the case at bar
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than it would be to any case involving a libelous publication. While
it is true, doubtless, that irreparable injury will be done to the com-
plainant and that it will be impracticable to ascertain the amount
of the damages, yet, in former cases, courts of high authority have
refused to base equitable jurisdiction of libels upon such grounds.
Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S., 385; Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence
Mfg. Co., supra; DeWick v. Dobson, 18 N. Y. App. Div. 399.
This case of M arlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, seems, in all material
features, to be analogous to the case of Kidd v. Horry, 28 Fed. Rep.,
773, in which the Court denied an application for an injunction to
restrain the defendant from publishing certain circulars alleged to
be libelous and injurious to the complainant's patent-rights and
business, and from making libelous and slanderous statements con-
cerning complainant's business. This case has been cited with
approval and followed by the N. Y. App. Div. in case of DeWick v.
Dobson, supra, decided in June, 1897.
In Bell v. Singer Co., 65 Ga., 459, Justice Harkins says: "We
recognize the rule that a court of equity, upon a proper case, has
power to enjoin the publication and circulation of a libel." This
statement, however, was mere obiter dictum, since the injunction was
denied in that case.
Therefore, if this case is brought up on appeal, as it doubtless
will be, it is difficult to see how the present decision can be affirmed,
unless the Court depart from the doctrines established by the weight
of authority in this country.
It is to be hoped that the Court will iake this departure, for
however wanting the present decision may be in the support of
adjudicated cases, it is consonant with the principles of common
sense and justice, which have always been regarded as the cardinal
principles of equity jurisprudence.
